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ABSTRACT
The decision to prepare for an oncoming hurricane is typically framed as a static cost:loss problem, based
on a strike-probability forecast. The value of waiting for updated forecasts is therefore neglected. In this
paper, the problem is reframed as a sequence of interrelated decisions that more accurately represents the
situation faced by a decision maker monitoring an evolving tropical cyclone. A key feature of the decision
model is that the decision maker explicitly anticipates and plans for future forecasts whose accuracy
improves as lead time declines. A discrete Markov model of hurricane travel is derived from historical
tropical cyclone tracks and combined with the dynamic decision model to estimate the additional value that
can be extracted from existing forecasts by anticipating updated forecasts, rather than incurring an irre-
versible preparation cost based on the instantaneous strike probability. The value of anticipating forecasts
depends on the specific alternatives and cost profile of each decision maker, but conceptual examples for
targets at Norfolk, Virginia, and Galveston, Texas, yield expected savings ranging up to 8% relative to
repeated static decisions. In real-time decision making, forecasts of improving information quality could be
used in combination with strike-probability forecasts to evaluate the trade-off between lead time and
forecast accuracy, estimate the value of waiting for improving forecasts, and thereby reduce the frequency
of false alarms.
1. Introduction
Over tropical and subtropical latitudes, a tropical cy-
clone is one of the most significant weather-related
threats to shore- and sea-based locations. Preparations
that can substantially reduce the impact of tropical cy-
clone conditions include evacuation, moving mobile as-
sets such as ships and aircraft, and preparing stationary
infrastructure for flooding and high winds. However,
preparations can incur substantial costs. The cost of
civilian evacuations is usually estimated at approxi-
mately $1M per mile of coastline evacuated (White-
head 2003), but may be as high as $50M in some areas
(Adams and Berri 2004). Baker (2002) summarizes
studies of preparation costs in specific industries, which
run into tens of millions of dollars. The cost of evacu-
ating U.S. Navy ships from Norfolk, Virginia, during
Hurricane Floyd (in 1999) was estimated at $14–$17M,1
and during Hurricane Isabel (in 2003), the direct ship
sortie costs were $36M.2 Avoiding unnecessary prepa-
rations would therefore be very valuable.
The level of preparation for an oncoming storm de-
pends on two factors. One is the availability and accu-
racy of forecasts with enough lead time to allow for
appropriate preparations. Modern observation, nu-
merical models, forecast methods, and coastal infra-
structures have significantly reduced the possibility of
tragedies such as the Galveston, Texas, hurricane of
1900, which caused an estimated 8000 deaths (Jarrell et
al. 2001). A second factor is the decision process of the
public emergency managers, property owners, military
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1 Source: “Navy Meteorologists Recommend how Ships Should
Respond to Storms,” Daytona Beach News-Journal, 25 June 2001.
2 Estimated cost of $6M, plus $30M in maintenance including
preparing docked ships to depart. Source: “Navy Costs For Isabel
at Least $105.6 Million” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 27 September
2003.
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commanders, and the public who decide whether,
when, and how to prepare. In the face of an approach-
ing tropical cyclone, decisions are often made when
there is still a substantial amount of uncertainty as to
where—and sometimes whether—the storm will make
landfall.
Between 1970 and 1998, 72-h hurricane track forecast
errors declined from a 5-yr average of about 750 km to
an average of about 400 km (McAdie and Lawrence
2000), and longer-range forecasts have improved
enough to allow for 5-day forecasts that are as accurate
as the 3-day forecasts were 15 yr ago. The addition of
strike probabilities to the National Hurricane Center’s
(NHC’s) forecast has given users further useful infor-
mation (Jarrell and Brand 1983). Although forecast ac-
curacy is improving, there will always be uncertainty at
the lead times required for some types of preparation
such as mass evacuation and moving ships to sea.
Therefore, improving the decision-making process in
the face of uncertainty has the potential to yield sub-
stantial value. There is considerable room for extract-
ing more value from forecasts without further improve-
ments in accuracy by improving decision processes.
Hurricane preparation decisions are usually exam-
ined in a static, one-time cost:loss framework, which is
a simple decision-analytic approach that has been
widely used to investigate the value and optimal use of
weather information (for an introduction, see Katz and
Murphy 1997, chapter 6). The ultimate impact of a
tropical cyclone is determined by a series of decisions in
which weather information and the natural variability
of tropical cyclones are critical components. To more
accurately represent the problem of a decision maker
facing an evolving tropical cyclone, the cost:loss sce-
nario must be extended to include multiple interrelated
decisions.
This study proposes replacing the static “prepare or
do not prepare” decision-making model with a dynamic
“prepare or wait” model that allows for the incorpora-
tion of new information in the form of updated fore-
casts. Additional value can be extracted by planning
dynamically for updated forecasts; however, to make
these decisions optimally, decision makers require in-
formation about how the strike probability will change
over time. In this paper, a Markov chain model of hur-
ricane travel with a binary weather outcome is devel-
oped and its parameters estimated from historical
tracks.3 Combining this storm model with a dynamic
decision model for a stationary target location (which
can be land or sea based), we show that the value of
anticipating improving future forecasts and adjusting
early storm decisions accordingly can reduce the ex-
pected total cost associated with a hurricane strike by
up to 8%. For some decision makers, the value of an-
ticipating improving forecasts is comparable to the
value of reducing the lead time required for a given
preparation action by 6–12 h. This added value is in
addition to the value of simply reevaluating a decision
not to prepare each time a new forecast becomes avail-
able.
The savings due to dynamic optimization come from
a reduction in false alarms. False alarms may be even
more harmful than their direct costs indicate because a
high false alarm rate may reduce a decision maker’s
willingness to prepare. Roulston and Smith (2004) have
shown in a theoretical model that the optimal choice of
an action threshold for ordering preparation is sensitive
to a compliance rate that is a function of the false alarm
rate in the forecast process. On the other hand, Dow
and Cutter (1998) do not observe this “crying wolf”
effect in their empirical study, and Baker (2002) reports
that evacuation rates did not drop after two false alarms
in 1985. The savings due to dynamic optimization come
at the cost of delayed, and therefore more costly, evacu-
ations in some cases. The dynamic decision method bal-
ances these costs against the benefits to achieve an ex-
pected net savings.
The value investigated in this analysis arises from the
decision-making process, not from improving the fore-
cast. A model, such as the Markov hurricane model,
that allows dynamic optimization will be less skillful at
forecasting than existing atmospheric models. In prac-
tice, the Markov model should not be utilized as a fore-
casting tool. Instead, it could be used to generate mea-
sures of information and uncertainty and their expected
evolutions. These measures could serve as an “informa-
tion forecast.” Such an information forecast could be
used in real time, together with skillful track and prob-
ability forecasts for various weather conditions, to ad-
just for the value of waiting and to approximate dy-
namic optimization.
It is important to note that any decision process that
delays preparation is only valid if the critical costs are
included in the analysis. This means that if delaying a
given preparation action would increase risks to life and
property; the delay must be appropriately balanced
with the risks associated with taking immediate action.
Our decision model is conceptual, representing a single
type of preparation action, such as a sortie of ships from
port. It is not intended to indicate that it is ever advis-
able to make no preparations in the face of an ap-
proaching hurricane.
3 Because the weather outcome is modeled as binary, all spe-
cific hazards (wind, storm surge, precipitation, etc.) are encom-
passed in a “strike.”
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The meteorology community is increasingly able to
measure and communicate the uncertainty associated
with its forecasts. As this study illustrates, the probabili-
ties of future events that are conditioned on the current
best information are not a complete characterization of
the uncertainty. This has been illustrated previously by
Mjelde and Dixon (1993), Wilks (1991), and Epstein
and Murphy (1988).
In addition to the quantitative data from observa-
tions, atmospheric models, and climatology, meteorolo-
gists have the insights gained from experience that af-
fect their own assessments of future events. They know
when they can anticipate information. For example, At-
lantic hurricanes commonly travel west, and then some
turn north and eventually east. The timing of the turns
largely determines whether and where the storm will
strike the Atlantic coast. If the storm does not turn
before some critical time, the storm will strike the coast,
and therefore a seemingly large amount of uncertainty
about landfall will be resolved in the immediate pre-
ceding period. Meteorologists and decision makers can
express this concept explicitly but in a qualitative man-
ner. However, current uncertainty estimates are often
based on historical error rates, although the NHC is de-
veloping a more sophisticated hurricane strike-proba-
bility model (Gross et al. 2004). Quantifying uncertainty
in a dynamic framework can help meteorologists com-
municate their expertise to decision makers. It can also
help to refine hurricane preparation policies to substan-
tially reduce the average costs of preparing for storms.
Decision analysis consists of a formal structure for
analyzing problems made difficult by uncertainty
through modeling the uncertainty that cannot be elimi-
nated and its consequences. The decision-analytic
framework has been used extensively in the meteoro-
logical literature to estimate the value of forecasts
(Leigh 1995; Wilks and Hamill 1995; Adams et al. 1995;
Brown et al. 1986). A back-of-the envelope calculation
of the value of hurricane forecasts in the eastern United
States puts the value at about $7B per year. This as-
sumes three landfalls per year (Powell and Aberson
2001), with 150 miles of coastline affected per storm,
and $17M of damage per mile. The $17M figure is based
on the assumption that NHC warning areas are cost
effective up to the limits of the warning area. Assuming
the landfall error is normally distributed along the
coast, and about 460 miles of coastline are warned per
storm (Jarrell and DeMaria 1999), and the cost of
preparation is $1M per mile (Whitehead 2003), this
yields an estimate of about $17M per mile of damages
if the warning were not issued.
The value of information is measured based on ex-
pected cost rather than realized cost because a good
decision can sometimes lead to a poor outcome. False
alarms are a classic example. It may be a good decision
to evacuate in advance of a hurricane, although the
hurricane may never make landfall. Retrospectively,
the evacuation was costly and unnecessary (a poor out-
come) but the decision minimized expected cost. These
concepts are used in a tropical cyclone context by Con-
sidine et al. (2004). This framework can also be used to
generate insights about the value of improvements in
accuracy. For example, Considine et al. showed that
incremental increases in accuracy of the forecasts of
tropical cyclone track and intensity would produce a
significant increase in forecast value.
In the meteorological literature, decisions have often
been modeled in a one-stage 2  2 cost:loss framework
(Katz and Murphy 1997, chapter 6). This framework is
easy to understand and to analyze, and may be appli-
cable to some real-world decisions. However, it is not
necessarily appropriate for every meteorology-related
decision. Reverting to decision analysis fundamentals
can greatly expand the range of decisions that can be
considered in estimating the value of information and
for structuring decision problems. In the context of hur-
ricane forecasting, dynamic decision making creates
value by reducing the frequency of false alarms, and
thereby decreasing the expected total cost (cost of
preparation plus loss of property or life due to hurri-
cane strikes at an unprepared target). This additional
value will increase the value of existing forecasts.
A dynamic decision includes more than one decision
point, such that 1) the alternatives available at later
decision points, or their consequences, depend on the
decisions at earlier decision points; and 2) relevant in-
formation is received between decision points. In a me-
teorological context, the information that is received
between decision points is usually a weather forecast.
The information can also be the outcome of an earlier
decision.
Several examples in the meteorological literature use
dynamic decision models, mostly for the purpose of
estimating the economic value of existing weather fore-
casts and hypothetical future forecasts. In all cases, the
sequential decisions are interdependent because the
consequences of each decision depend on earlier ac-
tions, but generally there are multiple weather events
that are not probabilistically related, and there is only
one forecast per weather event.
The major examples are the fallowing–planting prob-
lem, treated in Katz et al. (1987) and Brown et al.
(1986), and the fruit–frost problem, treated by Katz et
al. (1982) and Katz and Murphy (1990). Stewart et al.
(1984) conducted interviews with the decision makers
(orchardists) in the fruit–frost problem and found that
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they make their decisions on the basis of ongoing moni-
toring of temperatures, rather than making a static de-
cision once each night. Therefore, each night’s decision
would be more realistically modeled as a sequence of
decisions. To our knowledge, Considine et al. (2004) is
the only previous example using a prescriptive decision
model for hurricane planning. Their decision rule and
value-of-forecast estimate depend on just one forecast
per storm. However, they repeat their static calculation
for multiple lead times.
Mjelde and Dixon (1993) build anticipation into their
model such that the decision maker anticipates that
there will be a forecast, but does not know what the
forecast will be. They observe that the economic value
of longer lead times is overstated when the (unrealistic)
assumption is made that the decision maker does not
anticipate the forecasts, but acts on them when they
appear. The Mjelde and Dixon framework can accom-
modate a stochastic dynamic model of the evolution of
the climate, but they assume the climate probabilities
are not conditioned on earlier information.
Wilks (1991) and Epstein and Murphy (1988) are the
only prior examples, to our knowledge, in which two
correlated forecasts for a single event are used in deci-
sion making. Both are based on decisions of the same
cost:loss ratio structure as the multiperiod fruit–frost
problem. In this structure, a loss can be incurred at
most once, but the cost of protection may be incurred in
each of many periods. There are multiple weather
events, and up to two forecasts for each event. Epstein
and Murphy use a conceptual model for forecasts of
adverse weather. Wilks derives his stochastic model for
the probabilistic relationship between the two forecasts
and between the forecasts and the outcome of the
weather event (in his model, precipitation) on historical
precipitation and forecast data, and uses dynamic opti-
mization to solve for the best decision at each time step.
Katz (1993) also uses a multiperiod version of the
same cost:loss ratio problem, in which the previous pe-
riod’s weather serves as a forecast. The forecast is re-
lated to the weather outcome via an autocorrelated
Markov chain model of persistence. Though the persis-
tence model would allow for the use of earlier forecasts
in decision making, only one forecast for each event is
used because the cost of protection is modeled as con-
stant, and therefore there is no value to making the
decision before the best—that is, last—forecast be-
comes available.
Murphy and Ye (1990) also model successive fore-
casts with increasing accuracy for a single event and
investigate the trade-off between increasing cost and
increasing accuracy as lead time decreases. However,
they assume that the decision maker must decide ex
ante the lead time at which he or she will acquire the
forecast and make a decision. Only one forecast for the
event is used in decision making.
The current paper is the first to stochastically model
decision making with respect to a sequence of more
than two forecasts with improving accuracy for a single
event. The tropical cyclone context is very appropriate
for this approach because in reality, public managers,
military commanders, and other decision makers moni-
tor the storm’s progress and reevaluate their decisions
every time a forecast is updated.
2. Markov tropical cyclone model
Optimizing decisions in a dynamic context requires a
complete stochastic model that describes the probabil-
ity of every sequence of events and the probability of
every event, conditional on each possible outcome of
earlier stages.
a. Stochastic modeling
High-resolution meteorological models based on
physical laws may describe the current and future at-
mospheric conditions very accurately, but they do not
model the uncertainty in the evolution of the atmo-
sphere. Most methods for adding uncertainty to physi-
cal models, including ensemble forecasting, are based
on simulation. In a simulation, a system’s behavior is
recalculated many times, each time with a different set
of values for the uncertain parameters. After many
runs, there are many sets of results for the behavior of
the system, and the assumption is made that the sto-
chastic nature of the real system’s behavior, while un-
certain, is approximately described by the frequency
distribution of the system’s behaviors in the simulation.
A Markov model contains more information about the
evolution of the system and can be used as a tool to
generate a simulation, but it can also be used for ana-
lytical decision making.
Markov models have been used in decision making,
in prediction (especially as a way to model persistence
or other time dependence), and in developing probabil-
ity forecasts, especially for precipitation (see references
in Wilks 1995, p. 296). Wilks (1995, chapter 8) describes
Markov chains and Markov processes that have con-
tinuous state variables, and Katz (Murphy and Katz
1985, chapter 7) summarizes some applications of
Markov chains in a meteorological context. Readers
interested in a deeper treatment of decision making on
the basis of Markov models are directed to Puterman
(1994).
In a Markov model, the properties of a system at any
time are completely described by its state at that time
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and the system’s future evolution is described by ran-
dom transitions among these states. The key feature of
a Markov model is the memoryless property, by which
the evolution of the system (here, the hurricane) de-
pends on its history only via its current state. Therefore,
according to a Markov model, two hurricanes with the
same atmospheric conditions have the same probabilis-
tic future. This is the property that makes Markov mod-
els more analytically tractable than complex physical
models. In some sense, atmospheric dynamics are natu-
rally Markovian. In physical atmospheric models, the
future evolution of the atmospheric variables is com-
pletely determined by their values at any given time.
These values may not be known with certainty, and
even the most detailed physical models are necessarily
a simplification of the physical state of the atmosphere.
However, the temperature, pressure, and other param-
eters of every element in the model drive the future
evolution of the conditions of the atmosphere, but
would compose too many state variables for a Markov
model. The rate of change of atmospheric parameters
may be necessary to model the atmosphere usefully,
and can be included as state variables in a Markov
model. As compared with physical atmospheric models
and even one based on climatology and persistence
(e.g., CLIPER), Markov models are limited in the level
of complexity and detail they can describe, as well as in
their forecast accuracy; however, they contain much
more probabilistic information.
b. States of the hurricane
We use a discrete-time Markov chain model of the
hurricane evolution. In the terminology of Wilks (1995)
and Katz (1987), this is a first-order, multistate Markov
chain. The state of a hurricane is defined by the location
of its center and its direction of travel. The motion is
modeled according to transitions among these states,
which occur at 6-h time steps. Specifically, the hurri-
cane location is the 1° latitude  1° longitude cell con-
taining the hurricane center within the region 0°–70°N
and 0°–100°W. For hurricanes in the region 10°–25°N
and 55°–80°W, the direction of travel is also defined,
because in this region direction changes are critical. For
example, whether a hurricane recurves or not will have
a profound impact on the potential landfall location.
The direction of travel is categorized as “north” if its
direction is primarily toward the north, “west” if its
direction is primarily toward the west, and “other” oth-
erwise (see Fig. 1). If a hurricane is stationary, its di-
rection is classified as other. The cutoff between north-
and west-moving hurricanes is at approximately 0.7 ra-
dians west of north, rather than the more natural north-
northwest division of /4. This cutoff was selected to
minimize the occurrence, in the historical database, of
hurricanes that changed direction between west and
north more than once. The state of the hurricane at
time step t is denoted as st  (latt, longt, dirt). The
hurricane dissipates at time T, so a hurricane track can
be denoted s  (s1, s2, . . ., st, st1, . . ., sT). When hur-
ricanes are not in the 10°–25°N and 55°–80°W region,
they are not differentiated by direction of travel. There-
fore, there are a total of 70  100  2  15  25  7750
possible states.
The Atlantic basin hurricane database (HURDAT)
dataset (Jarvinen et al. 1984) contains the tracks for
Atlantic hurricanes and tropical storms. Although
HURDAT is a best-track dataset in that storm location
and intensity estimates were determined via postanaly-
sis for all Atlantic hurricanes from 1851 to 2004, only
the storms from 1950 through 2002 are used here. The
location of a hurricane center as recorded in the
HURDAT dataset is latitude and longitude to the near-
est tenth of a degree. These values are used to calculate
the hurricane direction of travel. The direction of a
hurricane at time t depends on the changes in latitude
and longitude between time t  1 and time t. The di-
rection for the first recorded location of a given hurri-
cane is therefore undefined, and is assigned to the same
value as the direction in the next time step. Each ob-
served position and direction of the 538 storms in the
dataset are categorized into one of the 7750 states, and
each track is defined as a sequence of observed states.
FIG. 1. Schematic of the method used to assign a hurricane’s
direction of motion in the Markov model.
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The historical database contained storm observations in
only 3333 of the 7750 possible states; only these states
were used in the model, with the addition of j  0 as the
state that indicates that a storm has terminated. The set
of 3334 states is called the state space and is denoted .
c. Transition probabilities
Hurricane motion is described by transitions among
the states, which occur at discrete time steps of 6 h. If a
hurricane is in a given state st  j at time t, then at time
t  1, it will be in state k with probability qjk  P(st1
 k | st  j). The value qjk is called a transition prob-
ability, and is a function only of j and k, not of time.
Speed and direction of travel of a hurricane in state j
are reflected in the states to which it can transition (i.e.,
states k for which qjk  0). Although qjk is defined for
all j, k pairs, most of these probabilities are equal to
zero, as storms rarely move to distant cells in one 6-h
period. In addition, hurricanes can remain in the same
state for more than one time step; that is, qjj  0 is
allowed. The number of transition probabilities is
33342, of which 9445—less than 0.1%—are nonzero.
d. Strike probabilities
A strike is defined to occur at a given geographic
location (target) if the hurricane center passes through
the 1° latitude  1° longitude cell containing the target,
or in one of the adjacent cells to the north, south, east,
or west of the stationary target, or in the diagonal cells
to the southeast and southwest of the target, but not the
cells to the northwest and northeast. This reflects the
fact that in general the extent of hurricane force winds
is greater on the right-hand side. For a given target, a
set  of states are in the strike zone; any storm that
passes through one of these states strikes the target.
The number of states in the strike zone ranges from 7 to
21 depending on the location of the target. For targets
whose strike zone is within the region (10°–25°N and
55°–80°W), where direction is also a state variable,
there are 7  3  21 cells in the strike zone. For targets
whose strike zone does not overlap with the 10°–25°N
and 55°–80°W region, there are only seven states in the
strike zone.
For each state j ∈ , the instantaneous strike prob-
ability is denoted pj and defined as the probability that
a hurricane passing through state j will eventually strike
the target. For a given target, the values of pj are the
solutions to a set of simultaneous equations,





Within the framework of the Markov model, all the
information available at time t is contained in the state
of the hurricane, and therefore the probability that a
hurricane in state j will eventually strike, conditional on
the information at time t, is pj. For information to be
considered good in a given state, which indicates accu-
racy is high and uncertainty is low, the state strike prob-
ability should be close to zero or close to one.
As reflected in Eq. (1), the value pj depends on the
strike probabilities in the next time step, which in turn
reflect strike probabilities in the following time step.
However, pj compresses the future probabilities into a
single, scalar value. A value of pj  0.5 could reflect
that in the next 6 h, all uncertainty will be resolved and
either pk  1 or pk  0  k such that qjk  0. Alter-
nately, it is possible to have pj  0.5 in a state j from
which information will not improve in the next 6 h (pk
 0.5  k such that qjk  0), or something in between.
The Markov model completely describes probabilistic
evolutions among states, through all the possible termi-
nal states of the hurricane. Based on the Markov
model, the way uncertainty will be resolved can be used
quantitatively in decision making.
As the hurricane evolves through many states, its
instantaneous strike probability also evolves; ps1,
ps2, . . . , psT. Sometimes the strike probability will in-
crease (decrease) monotonically. For example, a hurri-
cane may form and then move directly toward (away
from) the target such that its strike probability is in-
creasing (decreasing) throughout its progress. On the
other hand, a hurricane may evolve through states with
increasing strike probability, then change course and
head away from the target, so that its strike probability
declines. As will be shown in section 5, this nonmono-
tonicity can lead to a high rate of false alarms if the
value of waiting is neglected.
e. Data fitting and calibration
The transition probabilities were derived from the
climatological data in the HURDAT dataset (Jarv-
inen et al. 1984) using hurricane positions at 6-h inter-
vals for the 538 tropical cyclones between 1950 and
2002. The transition probability between two states j
and k is denoted as qjk, and is set equal to the fraction
of all hurricanes in the database that passed through
state j that then moved to state k in the next observa-
tion. The probability distribution of hurricane forma-
tion across states is denoted as r, where rj is the relative
frequency (fraction) of the historic hurricanes in the
database that formed in state j.
Forecast tracks are not defined in this model. How-
ever, the probability distribution about the most likely
track that results from the forward propagation of the
storm state using the Markov transition probabilities is
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well calibrated to the NHC strike-probability forecasts.
Table 1 compares the maximum strike probability at
12-, 24-, 36-, 48-, and 72-h lead times for the NHC fore-
casts and for the Markov model. A simulation based on
the model can be used to develop a probability distri-
bution of its future locations that implies a most likely
future track. An example of such a 72-h simulation is
given in Fig. 2a and compared with an NHC forecast
track and strike-probability ellipses (Fig. 2b) for Hur-
ricane Isabel. The most likely tracks generated by our
model are not necessarily close to the NHC forecast
tracks, because as discussed earlier the Markov model
is not highly skillful, as it is designed for its description
of uncertainty rather than for forecast accuracy.
3. Modeling tropical cyclone preparations
The real-world problem that we model occurs each
time an Atlantic tropical cyclone forms. Each tropical
cyclone is treated as an independent event. The prob-
lem is viewed from the perspective of a single decision
maker with assets at a fixed geographical location,
which we call the target. The decision maker can make
preparations that will reduce the damage caused by the
hurricane if it strikes at the target location. For ex-
ample, given enough lead time and a good forecast,
ships and aircraft can be moved from the path of the
hurricane, homeowners can board up their doors and
windows, and people can evacuate. However, prepara-
tion is costly and/or its effectiveness depends on the
lead time at which it is initiated. The decision to initiate
preparation must be made on the basis of incomplete
information, that is, the forecast, which is the best in-
formation available at the time.
a. The alternatives
Usually, analysis of the value of forecasts is based on
the assumption that the lead time required to complete
a preparation is fixed, and/or that there is only one
possible preparation action. However, many decision
makers have more flexibility than this assumption re-
flects. For example, when a tropical cyclone threatens a
naval installation, a set of predetermined disaster pre-
paredness actions are implemented. These “conditions
of readiness” are based on the anticipated arrival of
sustained 50-kt winds. To avoid unnecessary prepara-
tions as much as possible, decision makers would like to
wait until the last possible opportunity to initiate a
preparation. However, the timing of the last possible
opportunity is not precisely determined. First, the lead
time remaining before a strike, or before conditions
that will hamper further preparation, is uncertain. De-
laying increases the risk that there will not be enough
lead time to complete a preparation. Second, the
amount of lead time required to complete a preparation
may be flexible. For example, in 2004, Hurricane Char-
ley intensified rapidly immediately before landfall,
TABLE 1. A comparison of maximum strike probabilities at 12-,
24-, 36-, 48-, and 72-h lead times for the NHC forecasts (middle
column; http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/forecast/











FIG. 2. (a) Strike probability for 72-h positions based on the
Markov model of a hurricane in the 1° lat  1° lon box centered
at 68°N, 25°W. (b) As in (a) but showing the official NHC strike-
probability forecast for Hurricane Isabel (information online at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov).
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causing the U.S. Navy to order a sortie of ships from
Mayport, Florida, with less lead time than they would
usually allow. This is evidence that, if necessary, a par-
tial evacuation preparation can be completed in a
shorter time at greater cost (or lesser effectiveness).
Moreover, decision makers can reevaluate their deci-
sions every time a forecast is updated, and decide to
prepare, abandon previous preparations (if the deci-
sions are staged), or delay further.
To model this flexibility, we expand the decision
maker’s alternatives so that he or she has a sequence of
decisions at discrete time steps. We model the decision
for one type of preparation action. Many types of
preparation available to a single decision maker (e.g.,
to sortie ships from port, and evacuate personnel from
the port) would be modeled separately. Preparation is
therefore modeled as binary, as in many cost:loss prob-
lems, including in Considine et al. (2004). At each time
step, the chosen action is denoted as a, where a  1 if
preparation is chosen, and a  0 if delay is chosen. The
action will be a function of the state of the hurricane, st
at time t, defined in the next section, and will therefore
be denoted as. Because of the memoryless property of
the Markov model, the decision for a hurricane in a
given state will not depend on t, and therefore the sub-
script t is suppressed. However, preparation can be
made no more than once per hurricane. The hurricane
preparation decision is now framed as an optimal tim-
ing problem—a decision of when, not whether, to pre-
pare.
b. Preparation cost profile
The static cost:loss framework is equivalent to as-
suming that before a certain point, which we call the
critical lead time crit, the cost of preparation has a
constant value Ccrit, and after that point, no preparation
is possible. Adding flexibility to the model implies that
even after crit passes, there are still preparation actions
available that would reduce the amount of damage sus-
tained if a hurricane struck the target. However, it is
fair to assume that these actions are more costly and/or
less effective than preparation at crit. For example, re-
moving boats from the water, but not from the threat-
ened region would reduce damage, but not as much as
sailing them entirely out of the way of the hurricane.4
The cost of preparation depends on the lead time re-
maining at the time the preparation is initiated, which is
taken to be immediately following the decision. There-
fore, we model cost as a function of the minimum pos-
sible remaining time before a hurricane strikes the tar-
get, denoted , which captures the increase in the cost
of preparation if the action is taken with urgency, even
if the actual lead time turns out to be longer than the
minimum.5 Each decision maker has only one cost func-
tion for a given preparation action, which depends on
the parameter crit.
6
Costs and losses are normalized such that the miti-
gable portion of the damage caused by a hurricane
striking an unprepared target is L  1. The value of L
includes all damage that could be reduced or avoided
by preparation, including loss of life and injuries. Vis-
cusi and Aldy (2003) cite estimates of the value of a
statistical life (used in analysis of the value of reducing
fatality risks) that range from $0.9M to $20.8M in year
2000 dollars, which is enough to pay for a considerable,
but not unlimited, amount of preparation. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency used a baseline value of
$6.1M (in 1999 dollars) per statistical life in a study of
water contamination (Stedge 2000). At $6.1M per life
saved, a forecast leading to an evacuation for the
Galveston hurricane of 1900 alone would have been
worth almost $50B (in 1999 dollars). Lumping and bal-
ancing economic damages with risks to life and health is
morally and practically difficult, but it is an unavoidable
responsibility of government decision makers, not only
in emergency management and planning, but in envi-
ronmental protection, homeland security, occupational
safety, and many other public functions.
The preparation cost C() is a fraction of the maxi-
mum mitigative loss, and is equal to Ccrit at   crit, and
strictly increases, to approach L as  declines to zero.
This reflects the assumption that there is always a way
to mitigate the effects of a strike at least somewhat, and
no preparation that is more costly than hurricane dam-
age will be considered.
4 This suggests that there might be flexibility to prepare for a
hurricane at less cost if the preparation were undertaken with  
crit. For example, the U.S. Navy could prepare its ships to sortie
at less cost without paying overtime, and perhaps steaming at
lower, more fuel-efficient speeds if they decided to order the sor-
tie earlier. We assume that the preparation cost at crit is the
minimum preparation cost.
5 Cost of preparation could alternatively be modeled as a func-
tion of actual lead time, in which case its value will be uncertain
at the time of the decision. That choice would reflect that the cost
of the preparation action may be due to partially complete or less
effective protection such that some portion of the mitigative loss
would be incurred. This portion of the cost of the protective action
would be a function of the time until the hurricane strikes.
6 Because crit reflects the lead time required to complete a
preparation action before a storm strikes, it would include the
lead time required to implement the action plus any additional
buffer necessary; for example, hurricane force winds arrive about
10 h before the storm’s center (Powell and Aberson 2001).
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The shape of the cost function is specific to a decision
maker’s vulnerability, alternatives, and costs. The alter-
natives may vary by context; for example, there may be
preparations that cannot be initiated at night, as a given
preparation might have different cost curves depending
on the time of day. To conceptually illustrate the value
of dynamic optimization, we examine the performance
of dynamic and static policies using both a linear func-
tion and an exponential function, with each increasing
from C(  crit)  Ccrit to C(  0)  L. Murphy and
Ye (1990) use a similar, exponential cost function. We
further assume that the cost:loss ratio at the critical lead
time (Ccrit  Ccrit/L) is 0.1 (i.e., that the cost of prepar-
ing is 10% of the mitigative portion of the loss). The
actual ratio depends on the decision maker’s context,
and each independent preparation action by a single
decision maker has its own cost:loss ratio. The 10%
value was selected because Considine et al. (2004) es-
timated the cost:loss ratio for the oil rig evacuation
decision at approximately 9%, and 0.1 is approximately
the ratio implied by the average length of NHC coast-
line warnings together with the 24-h cross-track fore-
cast errors. Wilks (1991) also used 10% as the minimum
cost:loss ratio. To illustrate how the value of dynamic
optimization depends on the cost profile, we vary crit
(Fig. 3).
The decision maker’s objective is to minimize the
expected total cost of any hurricane. The expected total
cost is a function of the hurricane path (i.e., whether it
strikes the target) and of the decisions (aj). The total
cost for a given hurricane is equal to the preparation
cost if preparation is ordered, the mitigative loss if there
is no preparation and the hurricane strikes the target, or
zero if there is no preparation and no strike.
c. The forecast
The information available to the decision maker at
each decision point t is pj, which is simply a strike prob-
ability conditional on information available to that
time, as contained in the state st  j. For the dynamic
policy, the decision maker also has more information
about the future evolution of the hurricane, conditional
on each state of future information. This information is
contained in the Markov model. Track forecasts are not
parameters in the decision rules presented here, al-
though in practice they determine the strike-probability
forecasts (Crutcher et al. 1982; Gross et al. 2004).
4. Dynamic decision making with the Markov
model
We combine the Markov model with the dynamic
decision model to show how the static and dynamic
frameworks can be used to generate decisions, and
compare the performance of policies under the two
frameworks.
a. The policies
A policy, denoted as , is a complete description of
the action that a decision maker will take in any pos-
sible scenario. Each scenario corresponds to a state in
the Markov hurricane model. Therefore, a decision
maker following policy  will take action aj  ( j) ∈ {0,
1} from each state j.
Our reference policy uses a strike-probability fore-
cast in a static decision framework and is, therefore,
denoted S. The strike probability pj, defined in section
2, is a function of the state j and a given stationary
target location. In the static framework, the decision
rule for each state j is to prepare if the cost of preparing
C(j) is less than the expected loss. The static decision
rule, which defines the policy S, is therefore
Prepare if and only if C
j pjL for j  crit.

2
Although we refer to this policy as “static,” and the
decision rule in Eq. (2) does not depend on any other
decision points, multiple opportunities exist to prepare
for each hurricane by taking advantage of the flexibility
of late preparations. Beginning with crit, the static de-
cision rule is reapplied at each decision point. If the
preparation has not already been undertaken, prepara-
tion can be accomplished at a cost determined by the
FIG. 3. Sample cost profiles showing exponential and linear
functions with 24- and 72-h critical lead times.
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minimum remaining lead time according to the function
C(j). The policy is called static because the decision
rule does not account for future updated forecasts and
opportunities to prepare.
There are two reasons that late preparations may
occur under the static policy. First, hurricanes may form
such that their lead time is already less than crit. Sec-
ond, a hurricane may have a low strike probability at
crit, and later transition into a state whose strike prob-
ability triggers a preparation under the static policy. In
each case, the preparation is allowed at a cost of C( 
crit).
The performance of the dynamic policy, relative to
the static policy, reflects the value of anticipating more
accurate future forecasts, over and above the value of
monitoring updated forecasts and taking appropriate
action. The dynamic policy D takes advantage of the
stochastic hurricane model by planning for the oppor-
tunity to take action later, and quantifying the value of
future scenarios that can arise conditional on each pos-
sible updated forecast. Each state in the Markov model
is associated with a value, denoted Vj, and its value
depends on the values for all other states, and through
this value, on the actions in other states. Therefore, Vj
is a function of the policy D. Specifically,
•  j ∈ , Vj  1, which reflects that if the hurricane
reaches this state without a prior preparation, then
the mitigable loss is incurred;
•  j ∉ , such that aj  D( j)  1, Vj  C(j), which
reflects the cost of preparation; and
•  j ∉ , such that aj  D( j)  0, Vj  	k∈qjkVk.
For these states, Vj reflects the expected total cost to
the decision maker of a hurricane in that state, includ-
ing both the possibility of a strike on an unprepared
target and the costs of possible preparations.
The dynamic rule is prepare if and only if C(j) is less
than the expected total cost associated with the state of
the hurricane at the next time step; that is,
prepare if and only if C
j 	
k∈
qjkVk for j  crit.

3
Although a backward induction is usually the solution
method for optimizing Markov decision problems, in
this model the optimal action does not depend on the
time step t, measured either from the hurricane’s for-
mation or from its terminal state. Therefore, a compu-
tationally less demanding policy iteration method was
used, as follows:
Start, let aj  S( j)  j;
step 2, solve the system of simultaneous equations
represented by Vj  	k∈pjkVk  j ∉ , aj  0, with
the boundary conditions Vj  1  j ∈ , and Vj 
C(j)  j ∉ , aj  1;
step 3,  j ∉ , let aj  1 if C(j)  Vj  	k∈pjkVk
and aj  0 otherwise; and
step 4, check whether aj has changed for any j ∈  in
this iteration. If not, the optimal dynamic policy
D(j)  aj, j ∈ . Otherwise, repeat steps 2–4.
b. Expected total cost
The expected total costs (Figs. 4a–d) of the static and
dynamic policies are computed for targets at Norfolk
and Galveston using both the linear and exponential
cost functions. The value of crit is also varied from 6 to
120 h to represent varying degrees of flexibility. The
value of a forecast is equal to the difference between
the expected total cost using the forecast and the no-
skill expected total cost. The value decreases with crit
because even with perfect information at the time a
hurricane forms, the cost of preparation is higher for a
cost function based on a long critical lead time.
The white area in Fig. 4 represents the reduction in
expected total cost due to the dynamic framing. This
savings is also expressed as a percentage improvement
relative to the static policy’s performance, and is plot-
ted as a solid line. As an additional reference, the ex-
pected total costs under perfect information and under
a no-skill rule, which is defined as limited to climato-
logical information, are also shown. Under perfect in-
formation, the decision maker knows whether the hur-
ricane will strike the target as soon as the hurricane
forms [i.e., the expected total cost under perfect infor-
mation  	j∈rjpjC(j)]. The no-skill rule compares the
state-specific cost of preparation with the historical
probability of a hurricane striking the target, not con-
ditional upon the state. The expected total cost under
no skill is 	j∈rj min[C(s), pL], where p is simply the
mean of pj over all j. The savings resulting from the
dynamic optimization vary from 0% to 6% for Norfolk
and 0% to 8% for Galveston, depending on the shape
of the cost function and the value of crit. In both loca-
tions, the largest percentage improvement can be ex-
tracted by decision makers whose crit is in the range of
24–48 h. For Norfolk, there is a secondary increase in
percentage improvement between 72 and 96 h. This
contributes to a jagged appearance of the percentage
improvement curve, which is partly attributed to the
fact that at this time interval from the target cell of
Norfolk, many tropical cyclones that have tracked west-
ward across the tropical North Atlantic will either begin
a turn toward the north (i.e., recurve) and toward Nor-
folk or move straight westward and away from Norfolk.
Delaying preparation in this interval therefore yields a
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substantial improvement in information regarding land-
fall. This secondary maximum in the percent improve-
ment curve does not appear in the curves for Galveston
(Figs. 4c,d) as there is generally no bifurcation point in
the track where a recurve or straight track follows that
affects landfall at Galveston. A jagged appearance is
also caused by the discretization of the model, as dis-
cussed further below.
The high-value periods reflect a stage of hurricane
evolution during which information about the relevant
event—landfall at the target—is improving quickly. For
decision makers with crit  24 h, forecasts are already
quite accurate at crit and there are few remaining op-
portunities to reevaluate a preparation decision. Deci-
sion makers with crit  72 h do not have very much
flexibility to respond to improving forecasts, because
their costs of preparation become prohibitive before
the time forecast accuracy is high. By contrast, decision
makers with crit in the 24–60-h range can wait an extra
6 or 12 h and gain a large benefit in terms of improved
accuracy. They can gain substantially from planning for
their future opportunities to prepare after the next
forecast update. For some decision makers (at Norfolk,
with crit  96, 102, and 108 h) the value of framing the
decision dynamically exceeds the value of reducing crit
by 6 h. The additional analysis required to anticipate
updated forecasts is likely to be less expensive than
investments to reduce preparation lead time.
These results are dependent on the model specifica-
tion, which is relatively simple, though well calibrated
with the NHC strike-probability ellipses. The magni-
tude of the results also depends on the estimation of the
model parameters, and in particular on the transition
probabilities qjk, which were estimated from a finite
historical database. As the model is formulated, how-
ever, the additional value derived from dynamic opti-
mization is necessarily nonnegative, and depending on
the cost function, the lead time, and the location of the
FIG. 4. (a) Expected total cost of a hurricane under the Markov model, following each policy, for a target at Norfolk, VA, with an
exponential cost profile. (b) As in (a) but using a linear cost profile. (c) Expected total cost of a hurricane under the Markov model,
following each policy for a target at Galveston, TX, with an exponential cost profile. (d) As in (c) but using a linear cost profile.
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target, could exceed the maximum savings achieved in
our numerical examples. The difference between dy-
namic and static optimization is of similar magnitude to
the differences found by Wilks (1991) with the same
minimum cost:loss ratio, though he modeled a dif-
ferent decision process and a different meteorological
event.
Under our cost assumptions, no value is gained in
expectation from using later forecasts for decision mak-
ers at Galveston with crit  72 h. These decision mak-
ers are better off waiting, unprepared, for the hurricane
because only about 4.5% of hurricanes in the historical
database strike at Galveston. Given that the minimum
cost:loss ratio assumed for the preparation action in this
example (10%) is higher than the overall strike rate, the
quality of forecasts at long lead times is too low to make
responding to them cost effective. In the model, for a
decision maker with a critical lead time of 72 h, the cost
of preparation is 70% as large as a loss by the time lead
time has declined to 24 h. Even with perfect informa-
tion, very little flexibility exists for delayed prepara-
tions. This result does not imply that in reality decision
makers at Galveston do not benefit from forecasts,
because generally some preparation is available even
with very short lead times that can mitigate losses
somewhat. The cost function should be interpreted as
corresponding to a single preparation type. For ex-
ample, it might be true that the only way to sortie ships
when the lead time is 24 h is to hire tugboats at emer-
gency rates to take ships upriver, reflected in a high cost
C(  24), but there may be other preparatory actions
available at 24-h lead times that can reduce loss sub-
stantially (i.e., for many decision makers there are at
least some actions whose cost function is pushed to the
right).
In some cases (although not in the results shown
here), the static decision rule can produce counterin-
tuitive results when the static performs worse than the
no-skill policy. The reason is that repeatedly reevaluat-
ing a decision to take an irreversible action in a static
framework can be worse than making a decision and
sticking with it regardless of future information. As a
hurricane evolves, its strike probability can both in-
crease and decrease, and the changes will not necessar-
ily be monotonic. If the trigger for irreversible and
costly preparation is set at pj  C(j)/L, then the prepa-
ration is likely to be undertaken when the hurricane
strike probability is higher than it is through most of its
track. By repeatedly applying this decision rule with the
action trigger set at a point that is applicable for a one-
time decision, the decision maker will tend to prepare
too often. If the rule is reapplied, a tight trigger that is
optimal for a one-time decision will lead to overprepa-
ration.
The estimates of the expected total cost of each
policy and of the percent improvement of the dynamic
approach are functions of the storm model. Like any
model, its formulation is an inexact representation of
the real system, and the parameter estimates are de-
pendent on the dataset used to fit the model. To ex-
plore the impact of sampling variability on our results,
we run a bootstrapping process. For each of 100 itera-
tions, we generate a sample from among the 538 storms
in the dataset. The sample size is 200, which represents
a balance between preserving sampling variability by
having a small sample size relative to the entire data-
base, while keeping the sample large enough that the
dataset is not too sparse to generate useful transition
probabilities.
At each iteration, the parameters qjk, pj, and rj are
calculated as described in section 2, based on the 200
storms in the sample. Once the parameters are fitted,
we reproduce the thick line in Fig. 4a. The static and
dynamic policies are applied for each crit, from 6 to 120
h, using Ccrit  0.1, normalized to L  1 as in sections
3 and 4a, using an exponential cost function, for a target
at Norfolk. Then the percentage savings, or reduction
in expected total cost of the dynamic policy relative to
the static policy, is calculated.
The mean, median, and 5th and 95th percentiles of
the savings are shown in Fig. 5a as a function of crit.
The overall shape of the curve is very similar to the
curve calculated using all the storm tracks in the pa-
rameter calculations, shown as the thick line in Fig. 4a.
The greatest savings are 7.2% for the mean in Fig. 5a
and 6.2% for the results in Fig. 4a. In Fig. 5a, the largest
savings are for decision makers with crit in the range of
36–48 h, whereas in Fig. 4a, the peak savings are for
decision makers with crit  30 h. A difference between
the two figures is that the dynamic savings drop to
nearly zero (0.02%) in Fig. 4a, but in Fig. 5a we see that
although the savings drop off, they are still 2%–3% for
crit  120 h.
A second noticeable difference between the two
curves is that in Fig. 4a, the dynamic savings curve is
quite jagged. In particular, there is a major dropoff in
savings for crit  72 h. The jaggedness is a simple ar-
tifact of the discretization of the model: each crit
changes the cost curve, and changes the preparation
cost and optimal action in many states under each
policy. The jaggedness is averaged away in Fig. 5a, as
the mean, median, and percentiles are all taken for each
value of crit. Figure 5b shows the percentage improve-
ment for each crit for 10 of the samples, which retain
the jaggedness of the thick line in Fig. 4a.
OCTOBER 2006 R E G N I E R A N D H A R R 775
c. Simulation
The expected total cost results reflect a balancing of
two effects. On the positive side, the dynamic policy
prevents false alarms when preparation is delayed and
updated forecasts show that preparation is not neces-
sary. The negative effect of the dynamic policy arises
when updated forecasts show that a strike is more likely
than it appeared earlier. This leads to either a delayed,
and therefore more costly, preparation, or a greater risk
of a strike at an unprepared target.
To examine the contributions of these positive and
negative outcomes to the expected total cost, the static
and dynamic policies are also evaluated on the basis of
a simulation. Ten thousand hurricane tracks were gen-
erated by Monte Carlo simulation using the historical
distribution of the location of hurricane formations and
the Markov transition probabilities. Of the simulated
hurricanes, 8.3% strike at Norfolk, and 4.5% at
Galveston, as compared with 10.0% and 4.6% of his-
torical hurricanes, respectively. The expected total cost
for the static and dynamic policies for Norfolk using an
exponential cost function (Fig. 6) is broken down by the
type of cost: necessary preparations (for hurricanes that
eventually strike the target), false alarms (preparations
for hurricanes that do not strike), and unprepared
strikes.
The frequency of outcomes for each policy (Fig. 7) is
examined for the simulated hurricanes. The number of
false alarms is about 1500 (about 15% of all hurricanes)
under the dynamic policy and about 2000 (about 20%
of hurricanes) under the static policy; that is, the dy-
namic framing averts about a quarter of all false alarms.
The number of false alarms drops off for short critical
lead times (less than 24 h) because the relevant fore-
casts are more accurate, and for long critical lead times
because more often no preparation is optimal under
either policy.
This savings is partly offset by a slightly greater num-
ber of unprepared strikes and delayed—and therefore
more expensive—preparations under the dynamic
policy. Although the expected total cost is lower under
FIG. 5. (a) Percentage improvement of the dynamic model over
the static model for 100 iterations of the Markov model in which
the model parameters for each iteration are based on a subsample
of 200 tropical cyclones from the dataset, chosen at random.
Mean, median, and 5th and 95th percentiles of the 100 iterations
are shown for each critical lead time. The results are for a target
at Norfolk, VA, using an exponential cost profile, with critical
lead times ranging from 6 to 120 h. (b) As in (a) butt showing the
percent improvement in a subset of 10 of the 100 iterations used
to construct (a).
FIG. 6. Average total cost breakdown by hurricane based on a
simulated set of hurricane tracks, for a target at Norfolk, VA,
using an exponential cost profile.
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the dynamic policy, unprotected strikes make up a
larger portion of the expected total cost, as the savings
in reduced false alarms are partially offset by an in-
crease in delayed preparations and unprepared strikes.
Unprepared strikes make a larger contribution to the
expected total cost (Fig. 6) than their numbers (Fig. 7)
indicate because each unprepared strike costs more
than a preparation. The number of storms that strike
unprepared targets (the dashed lines in Fig. 7) is slightly
higher under the dynamic policy (a maximum 1.23%
higher, and typically K 1% higher, expressed as a per-
centage of storms). In addition, the dotted line shows
the number of delayed preparations. For these hurri-
canes, both policies call for a preparation, but the dy-
namic policy delays the preparation, usually incurring a
higher cost (sometimes the cost is not higher because
the minimum possible lead time does not increase).
d. Discussion
Although it is quite simple, the static decision rule is
not an unrealistic straw man. First, it is consistent with
prescriptive decision modeling in the literature. Consi-
dine et al. (2004) use a static decision rule in their pre-
scriptive model of oil rig evacuation and shutdown de-
cisions based on hurricane forecasts. To the extent that
their decision making is quantitatively based on fore-
casts, decision makers are likely to be following a rule
similar to the static rule, and in fact this is what is
suggested by Jarrell and Brand (1983). The most de-
tailed information officially available is the NHC strike-
probability forecast, which would support a static deci-
sion rule, but it would not support a dynamic decision
process. Some decision makers may intuitively adjust
for the fact that they anticipate a significant reduction
in uncertainty, but they would have to be very familiar
with tropical cyclones to be able to do this effectively.
5. Real-time decision making
The previous section indicated that there is value in
planning for future forecasts using a dynamic policy,
over and above the value of monitoring and responding
to updated forecasts using the static decision rule. How-
ever, dynamic optimization could not be widely imple-
mented in real time, partly because the decision model
is specific to the decision maker’s cost profile. It is not
as general as a strike-probability forecast, which applies
to every decision maker with assets at a given location.
A second reason this process would be difficult to
implement in practice is that the stochastic model re-
quired for dynamic optimization is not designed for
forecasting, and would not have nearly the accuracy
provided by current numerical weather prediction mod-
els. Ideally, it would be possible to create a highly de-
tailed atmospheric model that was fully stochastic and
therefore supported dynamic optimization and at the
same time gave highly accurate predictions with long
lead times. In a single model, a trade-off must be made
between atmospheric detail and stochastic information.
How then can the value of planning for future fore-
casts be extracted in real-time hurricane preparation
decisions? One approach is to develop an information
forecast that quantifies how information about a rel-
evant weather event can be expected to improve in the
future or, equivalently, how uncertainty will be re-
solved. The information forecast could take the form of
a time profile of information quality or of a measure of
uncertainty over future forecast updates.
A real-time information forecast could be used in
combination with track and strike-probability forecasts
and a decision maker’s specific alternatives and cost
profile to develop a decision rule that approximates
dynamic decision making. An individual decision mak-
er’s choices would be a function of the following:
• The available alternatives, at each lead time, and
their costs;
• the remaining lead time for a given hurricane;
• the strike probability and, ideally, the probability of
each intensity or wind speed at the target location;
and
• the anticipated information improvement that is rep-
resented in the information forecast.
In general, the necessity of costly preparation in-
FIG. 7. Frequency of each outcome for 10 000 simulated hurri-
canes using both static and dynamic policies. Hurricanes that are
not shown either had a necessary preparation at the same time for
both policies, or did not strike the target. The target is at Norfolk,
VA, with an exponential cost profile.
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creases as lead time declines, and increases with strike
probability for the target location. The desirability of
immediate preparation also decreases when informa-
tion quality is expected to improve in the near future.
For example, it might be optimal for a given decision
maker to prepare with a 72-h lead time when the strike
probability is 50% for low anticipated information, but
optimal to delay in the same situation, if an information
forecast indicates high anticipated information. De-
pending on the form of the forecast, a decision maker
would use it together with the other relevant factors to
balance the value of waiting for improving forecasts
with the value of undertaking preparation at a long lead
time.
As in the design of any forecast, the goal is to take a
large amount of information and distill it into a form
that is accessible and understandable to users and si-
multaneously make it as valuable to them as possible.
These information forecasts would represent a reduc-
tion of the information from a complete stochastic
model, but they would be more informative than a sca-
lar instantaneous strike probability.
In designing an information forecast, several trade-
offs must be considered. One trade-off is its degree of
reliance on historical information, such as track errors,
versus measurable characteristics of individual hurri-
canes including speed, intensity, location, and even con-
sistency—all of which are related to forecast error. A
hurricane-specific measure could even quantify some of
the information available in consensus forecasting (Go-
erss 2000) and in the systematic approach introduced by
Carr et al. (2001). For example, the measure could de-
pend on the level of certainty as reflected in the agree-
ment among tracks resulting from multiple atmospheric
models.
A second dimension in the design of an information
forecast is its level of specificity to a decision maker’s
context. At one extreme, an information forecast could
be as general as an accuracy profile applicable to all
hurricanes, which is no more informative than plotting
the average track error as a function of lead time. For
a given decision maker’s cost profile, this could be used
to achieve a rough understanding of the trade-off be-
tween lead time and accuracy. An information forecast
that was designed to take different values for different
target locations would have the potential to be more
valuable in approximating dynamic decisions. It is natu-
ral to think about information quality as dependent on
the geographic location of interest. For example, accu-
rate information about landfall at Caribbean locations
is available earlier than accurate information about
landfall along the Gulf coast.
An information forecast could even be designed as a
function of a specific decision’s objective. For example,
it could reflect the probability of the best decision in a
given context changing in the next 6 or 12 h. An infor-
mation forecast specific to a given decision maker could
include economic information by quantifying the value
of waiting. There is a trade-off between the portability
of a low-specificity forecast and the potential value that
can be extracted by each decision maker. Users with a
good understanding of their cost profile and a lot of
flexibility in the period during which forecast informa-
tion improves rapidly would benefit from tailored in-
formation forecasts and from tailored decision rules.
The NHC method for generating strike-probability
ellipses is an example of a compromise in these dimen-
sions. The hurricane track is specific to the hurricane,
but the probability distribution around each track point
is based on purely historical parameters (Crutcher et al.
1982; Sheets 1985). It is not specific to the decision
maker’s cost profile, but it is specific to each target
location.
6. Conclusions
The current paper models decision making with re-
spect to a sequence of up to 20 interrelated forecasts.
We have developed and integrated a climatology-based
Markov storm model with a dynamic decision model,
and estimated the value of dynamic decision making.
This framework allows for the explicit anticipation of
improving, updated forecasts.
The results indicate that a decision maker who has
the flexibility to wait for updated hurricane forecasts
can extract a substantial value from adopting a dynamic
approach. For some decision makers, the value of fram-
ing the decision dynamically exceeds the value of re-
ducing crit by 6 h. Improving the decision process to
capture this value is likely to be less expensive than
investments to reduce preparation lead time.
The frequency and predictability of storms in the
western North Pacific suggest that a dynamic approach
to anticipating improving forecast accuracy would be
even more valuable for typhoons. The value of the dy-
namic framework depends on the decision maker’s lo-
cation, preparation alternatives, and cost profile. We
estimate the added value for a multiperiod cost:loss
framework, with a single preparation action and binary
weather outcomes. The approach can be expanded to
include multiple weather conditions, such as varying
wind speeds, as well as staged preparation actions.
The insights gained in this work could be utilized in
an operational setting by elaborating upon the alterna-
tives and cost profiles of individual decision makers,
such as fleet commanders who must decide whether to
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sortie ships, and expanding the state space of the
Markov model appropriately, for example by including
intensity.
Another way to adapt this approach to real-time de-
cision making is to develop forecasts of improving in-
formation quality that could be used in combination
with strike-probability forecasts to evaluate the trade-
off between lead time and forecast accuracy, estimate
the value of waiting for improving forecasts, and
thereby reduce false alarms. An information forecast
would complement the increasingly accurate track fore-
casts and the new NHC strike-probability product that
will include multiple weather conditions (Gross et al.
2004).
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